| Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools. |
Pragmatism as a Philosophy of the Social SciencesUniversity of Cambridge, UK, pjnb100{at}cam.ac.uk This article introduces and critically analyses Richard Rortys neo-pragmatism as a contribution to the philosophy of social sciences. Although Rorty has written little about philosophy of social sciences as such, it is argued that his overall philosophical position has significant ramifications for this subject area. The first part of the article sets out the implications of Rortys neo-pragmatism for various issues in the philosophy of social sciences, for instance, the doctrine of naturalism, the nineteenth-century Methodenstreit, the philosophical tenets of Marxism, and the relatively recent wave of post-structuralism. The second part presents a constructive critique of Rortys neopragmatist philosophy of social sciences. Although critical of some aspects of Rortys argument, it is argued that his stance could provide a base for a fruitful view of social sciences, aiming at enlarging human potentialities rather than representation.
Key Words: hermeneutics naturalism philosophy of social sciences pragmatism Richard Rorty
European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 7, No. 3,
355-369 (2004) This article has been cited by other articles:
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||

